Pro-Russian propaganda on social media is undermined by the call to recognise the independence of the eastern Ukrainian territories: this call from Russia puts the Central African Republic and the Malian junta in a difficult situation. Vladimir Putin could have been satisfied with recognising the independence of the territories of Donetsk and Lugansk. But may be in an attempt to reduce its international isolation, Russia has chosen to call on other countries to recognise the independence of eastern Ukraine : an AFP dispatch relayed a communiqué1 from the Russian Foreign Ministry calling "to follow its example and recognise the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic".

The diplomatic rapprochement between Mali and CAR should therefore incite Colonel Goïta and President Toaudéra to respond to the Russian Foreign Ministry's appeal: if their answer is negative, it will contribute to isolating Russia on the international scene, but it will remain consistent with the Russian discourse which has been asserting for years in the press and on social media that Russia wants to help Mali recover its territorial integrity.

The Ukrainian crisis thus weakens the Russian propaganda that targets Malian social media: since 2013, actors in Bamako wanted to take advantage of the French army's anti-terrorist operation and hoped that France would also wage a war against the MNLA. As France did not meet this expectation, information operations were launched on social media to expel the French army and replace it with Russian forces (such as those of the Wagner group) who would not hesitate to attack the Tuaregs : Russian diplomacy therefore decided to support this discourse2 and promised to support Malian territorial integrity, in other words, to deny the independence of Azawad. But what credibility is left to a Russian or pro-Russian discourse that calls for independence on the one hand, and denies it on the other?

Another contention of pro-Russian propaganda is to accuse the West of neo-colonialism, but how can this pro-Russian "anti-neo-colonialist" discourse remain credible when Russia is annexing Crimea, and soon Eastern Ukraine, or more?

On the other hand, if Mali and the CAR were to respond positively, then Colonel Goïta would have to recognise the independence of Azawad, unless he adopts a stance whose duplicity would risk undermining his credibility: how can one be for the independence of Eastern Ukraine and against that of Azawad?

In short: because of the call from the Russian Foreign Ministry, pro-Russian propaganda is discredited in any case. As for Assimi Goïta, he has the choice between two losing stances : recognise the independence (or at least a real autonomy) of Azawad, or refuse it and discredit Russia, which brought him to power.