If the Prigozhin conglomerate was quick to invest in propaganda and media control when it arrived in the Central African Republic, in Mali it is the military junta that wants to use the media. Journalists in Bamako mention the army-press exchange days that took place on 10 and 11 February with the aim of establishing a partnership between press bosses and the Malian army.
Since the latest military coup, the Malian army has increasingly intervened in the activities of civil society: on thedailybeast 1 , Philip Obaji revealed that the day after the coup, the pro-Russian demonstration of 27 May was in fact organised by the military at the Kati base.
With these exchange days, the Malian army hopes that the media will "increase positive media coverage" of FAMA, and help them in "their all-out war of information and communication". In particular, the organisers denounce the "disinformation and intoxication campaigns" against FAMA and, to counter them, ask "how to transform all the actions of the Malian army into total and brilliant victories". And the objectives go beyond Mali, since they are "also to increase the esteem of national and international public opinion for the Malian Defence and Security Forces".
Adama Diabata said that journalists are actors in the war, and that they "must know how to edify the population with a flow of information that must be contextualised before broadcasting". He also proposed to put in place a charter of good conduct in the newsrooms to help journalists work better. And a retired officer explained that "the role of the journalist is to protect the Armed Forces to enable them to fight the enemy".
The reports of these exchange days give the impression that Malian officers were trained in hybrid warfare, and more precisely in Mattis and Hoffman's "Four Block War" doctrine. Schematically, it was Charles Krulak who initially proposed the concept of Three Block War to describe the experience of American forces during their operations in Somalia or other failed states: in one block they must wage war, in another carry out humanitarian action, and in the last, ensure peacekeeping. To these three blocks, Mattis and Hoffman add a fourth, intended for psychological and information operations. For Mattis and Hoffman, these operations must target the civilian population, who must be cleansed of the ideologies propagated by insurgents, and successful operational information "help the civilian population understand and accept the better future we seek to help build with them". However, Walter Dorn and Michael Varey have described the failure of the four-block war doctrine, in particular because it generates a confusion of roles : for example, it is not the military's job to do humanitarian work, but the humanitarian's.
And in the case of the Malian army, there also seems to be a confusion of roles, and a willingness to use journalists as auxiliaries to support miltary information operations. In the Central African Republic, when President Touadéra appointed Valery Zakharov as presidential adviser, the latter reportedly brought in specialists in propaganda and political communication2 , and organised the mass distribution of pro-Russian articles. The NGO Linga Tere confirms that journalists can earn 20,000 CFA per pro-Russian or anti-French article. In the case of Mali, it is the army that wants to use the media. This raises two questions: first, will the military also pay journalists for pro-junta articles? And secondly, what will a journalist or editor risk for an anti-junta article, or one that reminds us of the benefits of democracy?